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1 Introduction1 
This paper presents a series of studies (total N=579) which demonstrate that folk judgments 
concerning the reasonableness of decisions and actions depend strongly on whether they engender 
positive or negative consequences. A particular decision is deemed more reasonable in retrospect 
when it produces beneficial consequences than when it produces harmful consequences, even if 
the situation in which the decision was taken and the epistemic circumstances of the agent are held 
fixed across conditions. This finding is worrisome for the law, where the reasonable person 
standard plays a prominent role. The legal concept of reasonableness is outcome-insensitive: 
whether the defendant acted in a reasonable fashion or not depends exclusively on her context of 
action, no matter how things play out. Folk judgments of reasonableness are thus inconsistent with 
the legal concept of reasonableness. Problematically, in common law jurisdictions, the decision 
whether a defendant’s behavior was reasonable or not is frequently (though not necessarily) 
delegated to a lay jury. What could, and should, be done about this problem depends on what 
explains the outcome-sensitivity of folk judgments of reasonableness.  
 
Prima facie, the outcome-sensitivity of reasonableness judgments allows for different 
interpretations. On a bias interpretation, perceived reasonableness post hoc is inappropriately 
distorted by outcome information. This view comes in two flavours: The unmediated bias view, 
according to which the effect of outcome information on reasonableness judgments is 
(predominantly) direct. Alternatively, there is the mediated bias view, according to which the 
distorting effect of outcome information is mediated at least partially by another factor. What kind 
of factor? Perceived probability is, perhaps, the most plausible candidate. On this view, a decision 
is deemed more or less reasonable because the (beneficial or harmful) consequences of said 
decisions are deemed more or less probable post hoc depending on what actually happened. Or, in 
a nutshell, the outcome bias in reasonableness judgments could be reduced, at least in parts, to the 
hindsight bias.  
 
                                                        
1 I would like to thank Teneille Brown, Morris Hoffman, Joshua Knobe, James Macleod, Kevin Tobia, the members 
of the Guilty Minds Lab Zurich and the Editors for very helpful comments and suggestions. Research on this paper 
was supported by an SNSF Ambizione grant for the project Reading Guilty Minds (PZ00P1_179912). 
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Importantly, however, the fact that outcome impacts reasonableness judgments need not constitute 
a bias in the first place. The folk might deem it appropriate to assess the reasonableness of 
decisions and actions inter alia on the basis of the consequences these decisions and actions 
produce. In such a case, it is more adequate to treat the folk concept of reasonable as inherently 
outcome-dependent, and the outcome-dependence of reasonableness judgments would not only be 
consistent with but due to a correct deployment of the concept.  
 
In this paper, I will explore which interpretation of the outcome-sensitive folk judgments of 
reasonableness is correct and what this means for the law, in particular in common law systems 
where lay jurors (i.e. the folk) play a key role in adjudicating whether a defendant acted in a 
reasonable fashion. To do so, I will begin with theoretical preliminaries, focusing on the scope of 
the reasonable person standard, the legal concept of reasonable, and general problems that can 
arise when the law relies on jurors. A brief survey of previous pertinent empirical work motivates 
the experiments. The bulk of the paper reports three studies that suggest that the folk concept of 
reasonableness is outcome-dependent and explores what that means for the law – in  particular in 
countries where questions pertaining to reasonableness are frequently decided by lay juries.  
 
1.1 The Reasonable Person Standard  
Many of the law’s demands are tied to what it is reasonable to believe, feel, judge and do.2 
Negligence, for instance, is attributed if a reasonable person would have been aware of a 
substantial risk in the defendant’s circumstances.3 Self-defense can be claimed if a reasonable 
person would have justifiably feared for their life in the defendant’s situation.4 But reasonableness 
also plays a prominent role in cases concerning, for instance, excessive fees, rates or prices,5 
statutory rape,6 deceptive advertising,7 restraints on trade,8 delivery on contractually agreed terms,9 
or the public dissemination of private information.10 Consequently, the reasonable person is an 
                                                        
2 For discussion, see e.g. Fletcher (1984), Gardner (2001, 2015), Moran (2003, 2010), Westen (2008), Miller & 
Perry (2012), Zipursky (2014), Tobia (2018).   
3 Model Penal Code §2.02. (d) 
4 UK Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 85 sch. 3(1) (Eng. & Wales) (“A person may use such force as is reasonable 
in the circumstances in the prevention of crime [. . .] .”); United States v. Peterson 483 F 2d 1222 (1973); NY Penal 
Code Art. 35; see also Baron (2011).  
5 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012) (stating that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must set “the just 
and reasonable rate”;  16 U.S.C. § 2621(18)(B) (2012) (stating that states should ensure “a reasonable rate” of return 
when authorizing utility companies. More generally, see Berger (1977). 
6 Model Penal Code § 213.6(1)  
7 See, e.g., Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 2013); Elias v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 950 F. 
Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  
8 See e.g. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007), (“[T]he Court has repeated 
time and again that §1 ‘outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.’”); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 
U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (stating that “the standard of reason” regards anti-competitive trade restraints under the Sherman 
Act).  
9 See e.g. Mayfield v. Koroghli, 184 P.3d 362, 366 (Nev. 2008) (stating that parties must deliver on contracts within 
a “reasonable time”).  
10 Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D (1977).  
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authority on everything from the appropriate degree of emotional distress when under attack to 
which kinds of information that are deemed too embarrassing to have disclosed in public. 
 
The reasonable person standard, Gardner argues, “exists to allow the law to pass the buck, to help 
itself pro tempore to standards of justification that are not themselves set by the law, and which 
therefore are only as good as the standards of justification used by the person or people to whom 
the buck is passed.” Recurrence to the reasonable person allows the law to significantly expand its 
scope without the introduction of countless specific and controversial rules. Instead the buck is 
passed to the fact-finder, frequently a jury in common law countries, “who is invited to use extra-
legal standards to bridge the gap from legal rule to legal ruling.”11  
 
1.2 Two General Threats to Trial by Jury 
When the law “passes the buck” to lay juries, they need the relevant competences in the tasks 
assigned to them. One competence regards the grasp of the particular concept at stake as defined 
by the law. Jurors must know (often following instructions) how expressions such as “reasonable”, 
but also “intention”, “cause”, or “probability” are understood in the legal context. Another 
competence regards their application: Jurors must assess the reasonableness of the action, and 
other relevant features of the case at issue in responsible and unbiased fashion. In trials where 
jurors are involved, justice is thus under potential threat from at least two sources: unnoticed 
conceptual divergence between the legal and the folk concepts at stake, and cognitive bias.  
 
Naturally, once identified, each problem requires a different remedy. If the law takes itself to 
operate with a folk concept of e.g. reasonableness, causation, or intention, and this assumption 
turns out mistaken (the actual folk concept differs from the presumed folk concept), we must work 
towards conceptual alignment. On the other hand, if conceptual alignment exists, yet cognitive 
biases distort the assessment of reasonableness, causation, mens rea and the like, strategies to 
debias such judgments must be devised. Given the vast reach of the reasonable person standard 
and serious concerns as to whether the folk concept of, e.g. intention or causation fit the ones in 
use in the law,12 it is of interest to test whether folk judgments of what is reasonable are consistent 
with the legal concept of reasonableness. In order to do this, we will begin with a closer 
examination of the legal meaning of “reasonable”.  
 
1.3 The Legal Concept of Reasonableness 
What is the legal concept of reasonableness, and what should it be? This question has received 
considerable attention over the last two decades. One debate explores the conceptual category or 
nature of reasonableness: Does “reasonable” denote a descriptive or a normative concept? More 
precisely, must we understand that which is reasonable descriptively as what an average or 
ordinary person would do? Or must we rather understand it as what an upright or ideal person 
                                                        
11 Gardner, 2015, p. 36. 
12 See e.g. Alicke (1992, 2000), Nadelhoffer (2006), Macleod (2019), Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde (2017). 
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would do, in which case the concept of reasonableness would be normative?13 Perhaps neither is 
correct tout court, and the expression “reasonable” is ambiguous and takes different meanings in 
different legal contexts (Zipursky, 2014). It could even have a hybrid meaning with both 
descriptive and normative features (Tobia, 2018). A distinct debate examines whether it is 
appropriate to hold everyone, no matter their particular individual or “subjective” features to 
account with respect to a single “objective” standard.14 
 
The descriptive/normative and the subjective/objective debates are fascinating and of considerable 
practical importance to the law. I will set them aside in this paper, and turn to a third question 
which I will label the potential outcome-sensitivity of the folk concept of reasonableness.15 In 
recent work on practical rationality broadly conceived, I found judgments of what is reasonable, 
what is rational, and what should be done, to depend on outcome valence. In two situations A 
(negative outcome) and B (positive outcome), in which two agents have the same information and 
act with the same frame of mind, A’s decision is judged significantly less reasonable than B’s 
(Kneer, in prep. a, see also Baron & Hershey, 1988). These results are at odds with the legal 
concept of reasonableness (or at least the correct application thereof): Whether or not a decision, 
belief, emotional reaction or action is reasonable does not depend on the consequences, but the 
situation in which the agent finds herself. Or, to put it somewhat more technically, the semantics 
of the legal expression “reasonable” is sensitive to the context of decision or action, not the ex post 
context of assessment where the consequences are known (Kneer in prep. b, for the semantic 
framework, see MacFarlane, 2014). The Model Penal Code, for instance, is perfectly explicit about 
this with respect to criminal negligence.16 The short paragraph emphasizes that what matters is the 
agent’s epistemic perspective and circumstances and not some context ex post, and this is stressed 
not only once, but twice (see italics):  
 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should 
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result 
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to 
perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known 
                                                        
13 For discussion, see Ripstein (1998), Gardner (2001, 2013), Moran (2003), Westen (2008), Miller & Perry, 2012, 
Zipursky (2014), Tilley (2016), Tobia (2018).  
14 For discussion, see. e.g. Wells (1982), Kelman (1991), Armour (1994), Moran (2003, 2010), Lee (2007), Simons 
(2008), Nourse (2008). 
15 This question, whose practical importance might even exceed the one of the other two debates has received next 
to no attention thus far. Two exceptions are the excellent empirical papers by Baron & Hershey (1988) and Kamin & 
Rachlinski (1995). The latter is limited to probability judgments in tort negligence, the former explicitly includes 
“reasonable” as a dependent variable, though mentions a plethora of other expressions in the same scale. Both 
studies have very low power, and neither of the two employs a clean within-subjects design, which – as will be 
argued below – is essential to a proper understanding of the folk concept of reasonableness. 
16 The same emphasis on the agent’s circumstances is found in the definition of recklessness (see MPC 2.02 (c)), 
where the “reasonable person” is substituted with “the law-abiding person”. Many commentators, however, treat 
negligence and recklessness as very similar, and the “law-abiding person” as a close cousin of the “reasonable 
person”. Both negligence and recklessness are a matter of running an unreasonable risk, the difference lying in 
whether the defendant did so knowingly or not. For discussion, see e.g. Dressler (1995), Simons (2002).   
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to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the actor's situation. (MPC, 2.02. (d), italics added) 
 
Section 220.3 (regarding manslaughter) of the Model Penal Code further elucidates how 
“reasonableness” must be understood. Criminal homicide is a case of manslaughter if the killing 
“committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is 
reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be.”17 
 
The Restatement (3rd) of Torts on Negligence §3 further demonstrates the point:  
 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the 
circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct 
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result 
in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions 
to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. (italics added)  
 
What matters for the evaluation of reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood of harm, and the 
foreseeable severity of harm – in short, the foresseable risk. The law’s insistence on the 
foreseeability of risk thus limits the factors relevant for the assessment of reasonable care or 
negligence to features of the defendant’s circumstances ex ante. What actually happens, and what 
becomes known ex post, is irrelevant.18  
 
In short, the legal meaning of “reasonable” is outcome-independent (for further discussion, see 
also the excellent Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995 and Rachlinski, 1998). Imagine, for a moment, that 
it were not. Then the vast area of the law in which judgments of reasonableness take centre stage 
would be a matter of pure outcome-luck.19 Under conditions of risk and uncertainty, any action – 
no matter how rigorously thought through and carefully executed – can produce harmful 
                                                        
17 For discussion, see e.g. Low 1987 and Dressler 1993. 
18 Given that the law explicitly addresses the severity of the foreseeable consequences, one might think that the legal 
concept of reasonable care (and negligence) is outcome-sensitive. And in some sense, of course, it is: Holding 
probability fixed, it is considerably more unreasonable to embark on an action where a human life is at risk than an 
action that might lead to a broken finger. Importantly, however, the outcome-sensitivity thus understood regards 
possible outcomes. In the main text, when I write about outcome-dependence, I am interested in the influence of 
actual outcomes – whether or not the possible bad outcome does come to pass – on the assessment of the 
defendant’s behaviour. Differently put, when I write about the “outcome-dependence of reasonableness”, what is 
meant is not the ex ante, or epistemic, reading thereof, but the ex post, and thus partially metaphysical understanding 
of “outcome-dependence”. Thanks a lot to Kevin Tobia and Morris Hoffman for pointing out the need for 
clarification in this regard. Thanks to Kevin Tobia for drawing my attention to the passage from Tort law.   
19 On moral luck in general, see Nagel, 1979, Williams, 1993, Hartman 2017. With a view to the law, see Enoch, 
2007, 2010; Enoch & Marmor, 2007, for empirical work, see Martin & Cushman, 2016 and Kneer & Machery, 
2019. 
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consequences. But if reasonableness, on its legal understanding, were outcome-dependent, then 
the reasonable person standard would just be strict liability in fanciful disguise: No matter how 
reasonable the decision ex ante, if the defendant is unlucky and the consequences dire, her decision 
or action is likely to be judged unreasonable ex post.   
 
1.4 Identifying the Problem 
The legal concept of reasonableness is outcome-insensitive – what is, and is not reasonable, must 
be evaluated with regards to the context of decision or action, not post hoc, at a later context when 
the consequences are known. Preliminary empirical findings, however, suggest that folk judgments 
of reasonableness are inconsistent with the legal concept of reasonableness. People’s assessments 
of what is reasonable depend strongly on outcomes. This, we said, might be the consequence of 
one of two more general potential problems: On the one hand, there might be conceptual alignment 
between the legal and the folk understanding of reasonableness, yet folk judgments are distorted 
by an outcome bias. To put it differently: As presumed by lawmakers and legal practitioners, the 
legal meaning of “reasonable” is the same as the ordinary language meaning of the expression. 
But despite conceptual alignment, people might find it difficult to disregard outcomes. An effect 
of this sort is also found, for instance, when it comes to the ascription of causation and mens rea 
in between-subjects experiments (Alicke, 1992, 2000; Alicke & Rose, 2010; Nadelhoffer, 2006; 
Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2017, Bourgeois-Gironde & Kneer, 2017). Hence, if reasonableness 
judgments were distorted, we should work towards a better understanding of their underlying 
“mechanics”, so as to devise means to alleviate the bias.   
 
An alternative to the bias view is the following: The law might wrongly assume conceptual 
alignment. Whereas the law operates with an outcome-insensitive and dynamically invariant 
concept of reasonableness, the folk concept might simply differ – without the outcome-sensitivity 
of “reasonable” constituting a bias. The folk concept of punishment, for instance, is strongly 
sensitive to outcomes (Cushman, 2008), without this clearly suggesting that anything is amiss: 
People tend to judge deserved punishment differently across outcomes even in case in which they 
assess blame and wrongness identically (Kneer & Machery, 2019). If this possibility were born 
out, the law, with its perpetual insistence that what is reasonable just is what the “man on the 
Clapham omnibus” or “the average Joe” takes it to be, would be completely mistaken, because the 
women and men on the Clapham bus in fact have a different concept of reasonableness than what 
the law takes them to have. The law, that is to say, would unwittingly operate with a technical 
concept of reasonableness, yet assume that the legal concept is the non-technical folk concept.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Paper 
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 I will say a few more words about extant research 
regarding outcome effects in empirical legal scholarship and experimental jurisprudence.20 Section 
                                                        
20 Experimental jurisprudence is a young discipline which explores philosophical topics regarding the law by 
empirical means. See e.g. Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde (2017), Bourgeois-Gironde & Kneer (2018), Prochownik et 
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3-5 report three experiments based on the well-known TJ Hooper torts negligence case, as well as 
a medical malpractice scenario. The results suggest that the folk concept of reasonableness is 
outcome-sensitive, dynamically variant across ex ante and ex post contexts of assessment and that 
these effects are not due to the hindsight bias. Section 6 concludes by arguing that, out of the two 
threats to trial by jury we are faced with conceptual misalignment. It is thus of utmost practical 
importance for the law to come to understand that it is operating with a concept of reasonableness 
that differs radically from the folk concept and to take precautions against the likely injustice this 
generates on a daily basis.  
 
2. Outcome Effects   
 
2.1 Intention and Knowledge 
Culpability in Western criminal law requires both an actus reus (a “guilty act”) and a mens rea (a 
“guilty mind”). Since neither a bad intention nor a harmful accident, by themselves, engender 
criminal responsibility (Coke’s law), the actus reus and the mens rea must be established 
independently and treated as conceptually distinct. Findings from psychology and experimental 
philosophy raise a worry for this neat picture of two independent constitutive judgments feeding 
into culpability assessment: Outcome is known to influence all-things-considered judgments such 
as blame, culpability and punishment. It might thus be the case, that certain features of the actus 
reus – such as outcome valence and severity – affect judgments as to whether a defendant acted 
with a guilty mind.  
 
There is, in fact, ample evidence that this is precisely the case at the more inculpating spectrum of 
the mens rea catalogue. Outcome valence (good v. bad) has an impact on attributions of 
intentionality (the Knobe effect, see Knobe, 2003a, 2003b; for reviews, see Feltz, 2007, Cova, 
2016) as well as knowledge and belief (the epistemic side-effect effect, Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; 
Beebe & Jensen, 2012). Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that the severity of harm 
correlates positively with mens rea ascription. For instance, the more severe an undesired, yet 
knowingly occasioned harm, the higher the likelihood that people will judge it intentional (Kneer 
& Bourgeois-Gironde, 2017; Garcia-Olier & Kneer, in prep, Prochownik et al. 2020, Tobia, 2020) 
or that they will judge it as known or foreseen (Kneer et al., in prep).  
 
These findings are of importance for common law countries, where the mens rea question in 
criminal trials is frequently decided by lay juries. The situation might be similarly problematic in 
countries relying exclusively (or near-exclusively) on professional judges: The Knobe effect and 
severity effects have also been found to arise among professional judges, lawyers, and law students 
across several countries (Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2017 & Bourgeois-Gironde & Kneer, 2017 
                                                        
al. (2020) and Tobia (2020a) on mens rea attribution, MacLeod (2019) and Knobe & Shapiro (2020) on causation, 
Lidén et al. (2019) on the confirmation bias in guilt assessments, Strohmaier et al. (2020) on the hindsight bias in the 
law, Donelson & Hannikainen (2020) on Fuller’s theory of law, Struchiner et al. (2020) on the Fuller/Hart debate, or 
Tobia (2020b) on ordinary meaning and legal interpretation to name but a few.  
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for French judges and lawyers respectively; Prochownik et al. 2020 for German law students; 
Kneer et al., in prep., for professionals in the UK, Poland, the Netherlands and Colombia, the 
Knobe effect – though not severity effect – for US professionals, Tobia, 2020).  
  
2.2 Recklessness, Negligence and the Reasonable Person Standard 
The reasonable person standard features prominently in the lower echelons of the mens rea 
catalogue. An agent is criminally liable when grossly deviating from standards of reasonable care, 
be it knowingly (thus recklessly) or unwittingly (thus negligently).21 Although the topic has not 
been explored much in the empirical literature, there is at least some evidence that negligence 
attributions are outcome-sensitive (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995, Kneer & Machery, 2019; Frisch et 
al. in prep). In between-subjects designs, people are more inclined to ascribe negligence to an 
unlucky, well-intentioned agent whose actions lead to a bad outcome, than to a lucky agent, whose 
otherwise identical actions do not. Interestingly, the outcome effect on negligence is mediated by 
perceived probability: People deem a negative outcome more likely in retrospect than a neutral 
one and thus tend to be more willing to ascribe negligence in the former than in the latter case. 
This finding dovetails with Fischhoff’s (1975) hindsight bias, i.e. the change in perceived 
probabilities of events as they unfold.  Naturally, this is bad news for the law (cf. Rachlinski, 1998, 
Hoffman, ms.; Strohmaier et al. 2020). As the above-quoted passage from the Model Penal Code 
(2.02 (d)) makes clear, the law cares about the probabilities, and hence the risks, at the context of 
action, not some later context when the consequences are known. But if perceptions of 
probabilities and risks are outcome-dependent, it comes as no surprise that evaluations of 
negligence and recklessness – in contrast to what the law requires – are, too.  
The experiments presented below aspire to break new ground in several ways: First, and in contrast 
to Kamin & Rachlinski (1995) and Kneer & Machery (2019), the dependent variable of 
Experiment 1 (and the follow-up experiments) is reasonableness per se, not merely a related 
variable, negligence or probability. The implications of the results are thus considerably broader 
in scope, since the reasonable person standard is not limited to negligence cases. Second, 
Experiment 2 explores whether the outcome-dependence of reasonableness judgments is a 
fundamental feature of the folk-concept of reasonable, or a bias, as is standardly simply assumed. 
Third, Experiment 3 investigates whether the outcome-dependence of reasonableness judgments 
is but a consequence of the hindsight bias. This is done by holding perceived probability fixed 
across outcomes, so as to explore whether a direct effect of outcome on reasonableness remains 
under well-controlled circumstances. In sum, the paper aspires to make considerable progress not 
only as to whether outcome influences attributions of reasonableness, but what explains the 
outcome dependence, how it is to be interpreted and what all this means for the law.  
                                                        
21 Cf. MPC 2.02 (c,d), and Dressler, 2015 §10.04.D, see also Homicide Act 1957 s3 and Gardner (2015). For 
discussion of the reasonable person standard with respect to negligence, see e.g. Fletcher (1970), Hurd & Moore 
(2002), Moore & Hurd (2011), Alexander, Ferzan & Morse (2009) and Stark (2016).  
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3. Experiment 1 
The first experiment employs a between-subjects design to explore whether people deem a 
decision more reasonable ex post if the consequences are positive than when they are negative 
(holding all else fixed across conditions). The scenario is based on a famous negligence case, The 
TJ Hooper.22 In that case, the plaintiff lost two barges and their cargo in a storm, claiming that this 
was due to the fact that the defendant’s tugboats – the TJ Hooper and the Montrose – did not have 
reliable radio equipment, which could have warned them of the storm.  
 
3.1 Participants 
I recruited 179 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address was restricted to the 
United States. As preregistered,23 I excluded participants failing an attention check and those who 
responded to the first question (which required reading the scenario) in less than 15 seconds. 159 
participants remained (70 female, age M=43 years, SD=14 years).  
 
3.2 Methods and Materials 
Participants were presented with one of two conditions of the following scenario. The two 
conditions differed only in terms of outcome (positive v. negative; labels in bold omitted):  
  
Mr Garcia runs a flourishing logistics business with two dozen cargo jets. Until now, he 
has exclusively focused on air transport. He decides to expand to shipping and buys five 
cargo ships. 
  
For ships, there is a large variety of security systems available. They track other ships, 
make detailed weather predictions, and minimize risks for ships in distress. Garcia decides 
to get a package deal from a provider who installs several different types of maritime 
security systems on his cargo freighters. 
  
The provider offers different plans for servicing the security systems and updating the 
software. There are four options: A monthly check, a bimonthly check, a check every six 
months, and a plan where the systems are only checked and updated once a year. The yearly 
plan is by far the cheapest, the more regular the checks get, the more expensive the plan.  
 
Out of the four options, Garcia decides to take the second-cheapest. The security systems 
on his boats are thus checked and updated every six months. 
  
Positive outcome: Garcia's cargo shipping business has many clients. 15 months after 
commencing operations, there has not been a single security incident on any of his cargo 
freighters.   
                                                        




Negative outcome: Garcia's cargo shipping business has many clients. 15 months after 
commencing operations, one of Garcia's cargo ships crashes into a rock due to the 
malfunctioning of one of its security systems. The ship sinks. The 40 tons of crude oil it 
was transporting are spilled into the ocean. The damage to the environment is very serious.  
 
Participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the claim "It was reasonable for Garcia to 
choose the six-month service plan." Responses were collected on a 7-point Likert scale anchored 
at 1 (completely disagree) and 7 (completely agree). Next, participants were asked “[h]ow much 
praise or blame, if any, does Garcia deserve for choosing the six-month servicing plan?”. The 7-
point Likert scale was anchored at 1 (lots of praise) and 7 (lots of blame), the midpoint 4 being 
labelled “neither praise nor blame”. 
 
3.3. Results 
There was a pronounced effect of outcome valence on judgments of reasonableness ex post. In the 
positive outcome condition, where there has not been a single security incident, mean 
reasonableness (M=5.24, SD=1.43) was significantly higher than in the negative outcome 
condition, in which one of the ships crashes (M=3.96, SD=1.88), t(1,149)=4.70, p<.001, Cohen’s 
d=.76, a medium-large effect). As regards blame and praise, the situation was reversed. Mean 
blame/praise ascriptions in the negative outcome condition (M=4.92, SD=1.36) significantly 
exceeded mean blame/praise in the positive outcome condition (M=3.69, SD=1.05), t(1,149)=-
6.24, p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.01, a large effect). Figure 1 represents the results graphically.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mean reasonableness ex post and mean blame/praise attributions across conditions 
(positive v. negative outcome). Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Consistent with previous findings (Baron & Hershey, 1988, Kneer, in prep. a), outcome had a 








Reasonable ex post Blame
Positive outcome Negative outcome
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serious worry: The law employs an outcome-insensitive concept of reasonableness, but people’s 
post hoc evaluations of whether an agent’s decisions were reasonable are strongly sensitive to 
outcomes. Given these results, the question arises which of the two threats to trial by jury discussed 
in the introduction is at stake. Are we facing a performance error in the application of a folk 
concept of reasonableness that is identical to the legal one in so far as it is outcome-insensitive (if 
correctly employed)? Or might there be tacit conceptual divergence, i.e. might it be the case that 
the folk concept of reasonableness just is outcome-sensitive, and thus differs from the legal 
concept?  
 
Just like our first experiment, the little work that touches upon the reasonable person standard in 
existence cannot answer this question. Kamin and Rachlinski (who test for probability and 
negligence rather than reasonableness more generally) ran a between-subjects design, Baron & 
Hershey (1986) presented participants with a whole battery of scenarios with good and bad 
outcomes. In order to better understand what drives the outcome effect in assessments of 
reasonableness ex post, and thus to identify which of the two threats to jury trial is at stake, a 
different design is required: We should explore whether people, when assessing a decision or 
action ex ante – i.e. before the consequences are known – are willing to change their evaluations 
of reasonableness ex post once the consequences have been revealed. If people, in the novel design, 
assess reasonableness by and large the same ex ante and ex post, this would indicate that their 
concept or reasonableness is, like the legal one, outcome-independent. The fact that, in between-
subjects designs, we find a pronounced outcome effect could thus be interpreted as a performance 
error or bias. If, on the other hand, people change their views of whether an action was reasonable 
ex post in contrast to what they judged ex ante on the basis of the outcome, then the folk concept 
is simply not what the law presumes it to be. In that case, the folk concept of reasonableness (qua 
folk concept) is appropriately sensitive to outcome, and the outcome effect in Experiment 1 the 
consequence of its proper application.  
 
4. Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 is to investigate whether the outcome-sensitivity of reasonableness 
judgments ex post constitutes a performance error or else, whether the folk concept of 
reasonableness is simply outcome-sensitive (in contrast to the legal concept). If people judge 
reasonableness ex ante and ex post the same, we would have evidence in favour of the former 
hypothesis. If people’s ex post judgments of reasonableness diverge from their ex ante judgments 
depending on outcome, we would have evidence in favour of the latter hypothesis.   
 
4.1 Participants 
I recruited 181 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address was restricted to the 
United States. As preregistered,24 I excluded participants failing an attention check and those who 
                                                        
24 https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=hp8zx4 
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responded to the first question (which required reading the scenario) in less than 15 seconds. 148 
participants remained (71 female, age M=43 years, SD=13 years).  
 
4.2 Methods & Materials 
The materials were similar to those in Experiment 1. The main difference was that, once Garcia’s 
general situation has been explained, participants are merely told that Garcia considers choosing 
the second-least expensive security plan, according to which the boats are serviced every six 
months. They then had to state whether they agree or disagree with the claim that “[i]t is reasonable 
for Garcia to choose the six-month service plan” on a 7-point Likert scale. Differently put, 
participants rated reasonableness at the context of decision, i.e. reasonableness ex ante. On the 
next screen, participants were told that Garcia in fact chose the six-month plan, and they were 
presented with either the positive outcome (smooth sailing) or negative outcome (one of the boats 
crashes). They were then asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the claim that it was 
reasonable for Garcia to choose that plan (7-point Likert scale), and to what extent they would 
attribute praise or blame to him for deciding as he did (7-point Likert scale, for details, see 
Appendix). The mixed design experiment thus allows us to contrast perceived reasonableness ex 
ante and ex post for each of the two conditions, and reasonableness ex post and blame across 




3.3.1 Within-subjects Results 
In this experiment, people rated the reasonableness of Garcia’s decision both before the outcome 
was revealed, and once again once outcomes had been presented. The purpose of the experiment 
was to explore whether, on average, people change their assessment of the reasonableness of a 
decision in light of its consequences once the latter are revealed. This was indeed the case for both 
outcomes. In the positive outcome condition, people deemed it significantly more reasonable for 
Garcia to choose the six-month plan ex post (M=5.40, SD=1.53) than they did ex ante (M=5.12, 
SD=1.62), paired-samples t-test, t(1,77)=-2.58, p=.012, Cohen’s d=.29, a small effect, see Figure 
2. In the negative outcome condition, people deemed it significantly less reasonable to choose the 
six-month plan ex post (M=4.09, SD=1.99) than they did ex ante (M=5.43, SD=1.48), 




Figure 2: Mean reasonableness ex ante and ex post across outcomes. Error bars denote standard 
error of the mean.  
 
3.3.2 Between-subjects Results  
The first part of the scenario (at which the outcome is still withheld) was identical across 
conditions. Consequently, assessments of reasonableness ex ante should not differ, which is 
indeed what we find (independent samples t-test, t(1,146)=-1.22, p=.223, two-tailed). 
Participants across the different conditions then viewed the distinct outcomes on a second screen, 
and had to assess reasonableness ex post. The impact of outcome on reasonableness was 
significant, t(1,146)=4.52, p<.001, Cohen’s d=.74, a medium-large effect, see Figure 3. The 
same held for blame/praise, t(1,146)=-6.43, p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.06). 
 
 
Figure 3: Mean reasonableness ex post and mean blame/praise attributions across conditions 
(positive v. negative outcome). Error bars denote standard error of the mean.  
 
3.3.3 Comparison across Designs 
The data collected so far allows a further analysis: We can explore whether reasonableness 
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technique for debiasing purposes, results from Experiment 2) and subjects exclusively confronted 
with questions of reasonableness ex post (Experiment 1). The same analysis can be conducted for 
blame. A 2 (outcome: positive v. negative) x 2 (design: ex ante assessment or priming v. no ex 
ante assessment or no priming) ANOVA reveals the expected significant main effect for outcome 
(F(1,295)=42.43, p<.001). Importantly, though, there was neither a significant main effect for 
experiment design (F(1,295=.49, p=.484) nor a significant outcome*design interaction 
(F(1,295)=.005, p=.941). For blame, the pattern of results was the same: a significant main effect 
for outcome (F(1,295)=79.94, p<.001), a nonsignificant main effect for design (F(1,295)=.27, 
p=.601) as well as a nonsignificant interaction (F(1,295)=.01, p=.941). This is quite remarkable: 
Priming people by aid of an ex ante assessment of the reasonableness of Garcia’s decision – and 
thus potentially immunizing them against an outcome effect or hindsight bias – had no effect 
whatsoever. Note that the probability of finding a mid-size effect of f=.25 with the recruited sample 
size of N=299 across the two experiments and an alpha of .05 exceeds 99% to find such an effect, 
if there is one to be found (power analysis conducted with G*Power 3.1).  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, and broadly in tune with those of Baron & Hershey 
(1988) and Kamin & Rachlinski (1995), we found that ascriptions of reasonableness (or related 
variables) are outcome-dependent. None of these previous studies, however, address the central 
question of whether the outcome effect testifies to a biased ascription of an outcome-insensitive 
concept of reasonableness, or whether the folk-concept of reasonableness simply is outcome-
dependent (and thus correctly applied). The design of Experiment 2 sheds some light on the matter, 
because participants judge Garcia’s decision both ex ante and ex post. If the outcome effect on 
reasonableness were a bias, then people would presumably not change their assessment once the 
consequences have been revealed. Interestingly, they do: People judge a decision that leads to 
negative consequences as less reasonable ex post than ex ante, and a decision that leads to positive 
consequences as more reasonable ex post than ex ante. Furthermore, the two-step procedure (first 
ex ante, then ex post assessment) does not mitigate the outcome effect on reasonableness ex post 
at all, as our comparison between Experiment 1 (only ex post assessments) and Experiment 2 
(assessment both ex ante and ex post) reveal. Together, the results suggest that the folk concept of 
reasonableness is genuinely outcome-dependent, and thus diverges radically from the legal 
concept, and from what the law assumes about the folk concept. 
 
There is a final worry. Kamin & Rachlinski (1995) as well as Kneer & Machery (2018) have 
argued that the outcome effect on negligence is due to an outcome effect on perceived probability 
post hoc. In other words, the outcome effect on negligence is mediated by perceived probability 
post hoc. A similar hypothesis is possible for reasonableness more broadly conceived: The fact 
that the probability of harm post hoc is judged higher when harm actually does occur than when it 
does not might lead people to evaluate a decision that leads to harm as less reasonable than one 
that does not. Whereas an outcome effect on the perceived probability of the sort invoked here is 
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standardly interpreted as a bias,25 a rationalist interpretation is also possible.26 Especially in cases 
where probabilities are fuzzy and hard to assess, it makes sense to use outcomes as an indicator of 
an event’s probability: Whether a decision or action did lead to a particular outcome or not 
constitutes useful information for the assessment (and potential reassessment) of whether it was 
likely that it would lead to that sort of outcome. While this is an interesting question to pursue in 
further detail, our final experiment focuses on an even more fundamental one: Is there, at least 
sometimes, a direct or unmediated effect of outcome on reasonableness ex post? In other words, 
can an outcome effect on reasonableness ex post be observed even if we were to hold perceived 
probability ex post constant across conditions? If so, this would show that the outcome-sensitivity 
of reasonableness cannot be reduced to a hindsight effect – whether the latter is best interpreted as 
a bias or not.   
  
5. Experiment 3 
The goal of the final experiment consists in exploring the effect of outcome on reasonableness in 
situations where the risk can be clearly quantified ex ante. The vignette explicitly specifies the 
probability of a harmful outcome, which, paired with a manipulation check focusing on 
probability, allows us to minimize the influence of the hindsight effect on reasonableness 
attributions. That way, we can explore whether the outcome-effect on reasonableness is tied to 
perceived probability, or whether outcome can influence perceived reasonableness directly.  
 
The vignette itself is based on a duty of care case – a type of case where reasonableness also plays 
a central role. Manufacturers, for instance, must exercise reasonable care in providing consumers 
with safe products, doctors are under the obligation to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to their 
patients. In cases of this sort, it is once again up to the fact-finder to decide what, exactly, 




I recruited 219 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address was restricted to the 
United States. As preregistered,27 I excluded participants failing an attention check and those who 
responded to the first question (which required reading the scenario) in less than 15 seconds. As 
also preregistered (and detailed below), I also excluded all participants who, after having learned 
the outcome, did not report the precise probability of a harmful consequence, which was specified 
explicitly in the scenario. This ensured that the outcome effect on reasonableness ex post was not 
                                                        
25 For instance by Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995, as well as nearly all the papers on the “hindsight bias” surveyed by 
Rachlinski, 1998. Note how rare it is to read about a hindsight effect rather than a hindsight bias. The problem is 
discussed in more detail by Kneer & Machery (2018), who explore the rationalistic interpretation of the hindsight 
effect at length.  
26 I’d like to thank Joshua Knobe for pressing me on this important point.  
27 https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ng28n4 
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driven by the hindsight bias (i.e. a diverging assessment of probability ex ante v. ex post). 125 
participants remained (55 female, age M=41 years, SD=13 years).  
 
5.2 Methods and Materials 
Like Experiment 2, Experiment 3 also took a 2 (between-subjects factor outcome: positive v. 
negative) x 2 (within-subjects factor reasonableness: ex ante v. ex post) design. All participants 
were presented with the following first part of the vignette and had to rate the doctor’s decision to 
prescribe a certain drug on a 7-point Likert scale:  
 
Ms Woods goes to the hospital since she has been experiencing severe abdominal pain for 
several days. Dr Miller examines her carefully and concludes that she has an inflammation 
of the intestines. 
  
Dr Miller is thinking about prescribing a new drug called Fluxis, which has proven very 
effective with the kinds of inflammation Ms Woods has. As most drugs, it has some 
possible side-effects. According to recent studies, there's a 3% probability that Fluxis will 
cause damage to the liver. 
  
Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following claim: 
  
"It is reasonable for Miller to prescribe Fluxis." (1: completely disagree – 7: completely 
agree) 
 
Having responded to the reasonableness ex ante question, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two outcomes (labels in square brackets omitted):  
 
[Good outcome] Dr Miller prescribes the drug Fluxis to Ms Woods. The drug works 
perfectly. The inflammation is cured within days, and Ms Woods has no side-effects 
whatsoever.   
 
[Bad outcome] Dr Miller prescribes the drug Fluxis to Ms Woods. The drug does not work 
as hoped. The inflammation persists and Fluxis causes serious damage to Ms Woods' liver.  
 
Q1: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following claim:  
"It was reasonable for Miller to prescribe Fluxis." (1: completely disagree – 7: completely 
agree) 
 
Q2: How much praise or blame, if any, does Miller deserve for prescribing Fluxis to Ms 
Woods? (1: lots of praise, 4: neither praise nor blame, 7: lots of blame). 
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Besides responding to the two main questions, participants also had to answer the following 
question regarding probability: “On a scale of 0% (completely unlikely) to 100% (certain), how 
high was the probability that Fluxis would cause damage to the liver?”. As explained above, this 
question served as a manipulation check. In order to explore the impact of outcome on 
reasonableness independently of a hindsight effect, those participants who did not respond that the 
probability of liver damage was 3% (as specified in the vignette) were excluded.  
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Within-subjects Results 
In the positive outcome condition, people deemed it significantly more reasonable to prescribe the 
drug ex post (M=5.98, SD=1.38) than they did ex ante (M=5.45, SD=1.40), paired-samples t-test, 
t(1,61)=-4.40, p<.001, Cohen’s d=.56, a medium-sized effect). In the negative outcome condition, 
people deemed it significantly less reasonable to prescribe the drug ex post (M=4.51, SD=1.76) 
than they did ex ante (M=5.48, SD=1.27), t(1,62)=7.04, p<.001, Cohen’s d=.89, a large effect), 
see Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean reasonableness ex ante and ex post across outcomes. Error bars denote standard 
error of the mean.  
 
5.3.2 Between-subjects Results 
Across conditions, outcome had a significant impact on reasonableness ex post, independent-
samples t-test t(1,123)=5.28, p<.001, Cohen’s d=.94, a large effect.28 The same held true for blame, 
t(1, 123)=-6.06, p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.08, a large effect), see Figure 5.29  
 
                                                        
28 Unsurprisingly, there is no significant difference across conditions for reasonableness ex ante (t(1,123)=-.103, 
p=.918), since the two conditions are – at that point – still identical (outcomes have not yet been revealed).  
29 As expected, all contrasts remain strongly significant when one leaves those participants who did not respond with 
the exact probability of a harmful outcome in the dataset (N=157). There was no significant effect of outcome on 
perceived probability post hoc, t(1,155)=-.715, p=.476). This suggest that, in explicitly specifying the probability in 
the scenario, we managed to limit its potential effect even without excluding all those who participants who did not 
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Figure 5: Mean reasonableness ex post and mean blame/praise attributions across conditions 
(positive v. negative outcome). Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Replicating the between-subjects results from Experiments 1 and 2, we found that decisions 
leading to a negative consequence are judged less reasonable post hoc than those that lead to 
positive consequences. Replicating the within-subjects results from Experiment 2, people judge 
the reasonableness of a decision producing harm as less reasonable ex post than ex ante (before 
the outcome was known), and vice versa for positive outcomes. These findings suggest that the 
folk application of the concept of reasonableness is not subject to a performance error, but that the 
folk work with a concept of reasonableness which is outcome-dependent. Is this outcome-
dependence driven by a hindsight effect, as some scholars like Kamin and Rachlinski (1995) 
suggest? Perhaps, in certain situations, this might also be the case. However, even when one 
carefully controls for potential hindsight bias, we find a strong direct effect of outcome on 
reasonableness.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In their capacity as fact-finders determining what is, and is not, reasonable, jurors, we said, must 
have two types of competences: They must have concept competence, i.e. understand and use the 
legal concept of reasonableness. And they must possess application competence, that is, they must 
not fall prey to cognitive biases when deciding what is reasonable and what is not.  
 
The legal concept of reasonableness is outcome-insensitive and dynamically invariant. In other 
words, whether a decision produces a positively or negatively valenced outcome must not have an 
impact on whether it is judged reasonable, and a decision that is reasonable ex ante remains 
reasonable ex post, even if it produces undesirable consequences. In line with previous, vaguely 
related studies, however, all three experiments suggest that folk attributions of reasonableness are 
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assumed by the law – the legal concept of reasonableness just is the folk concept of reasonableness, 
then the potential jurors fall prey to an outcome bias, as they tend to also do in the attribution of 
mens rea. Or else, second, folk ascriptions might actually be true to the folk concept of 
reasonableness – a concept that is very different from the legal concept of reasonableness and from 
what the law takes the folk concept to be. Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that this is in fact the case: 
Even in within-subjects designs, people find it perfectly perfectly appropriate to revise their ex 
ante assessments of reasonableness ex post. It thus appears that outcome-sensitivity is built into 
the ordinary language expression “reasonable” and the concept it denotes. The law seems to 
wrongly assume conceptual alignment and unwittingly operate with a technical (outcome-
insensitive) concept of reasonableness.  
 
Hardnosed advocates of the bias interpretation could, broadly in line with Kamin and Rachlinski 
(1995), object to our preliminary conclusion in the following way: What is, and is not reasonable 
is (at least frequently) tied to the notion of risk, i.e. the product of probability and severity of  
outcome. Given that probability assessments are subject to the exceptionally robust and pervasive 
hindsight bias, the variation of reasonableness assessed ex ante vs. ex post might simply be a 
consequence of distorted probability judgments. The findings from Experiment 3, however, 
suggest that this objection is on the wrong track.30 Even if we hold perceived probability fixed 
across the ex ante context of decision and the ex post context of assessment on the one hand, as 
well as across differently valenced outcomes on the other, our results from Experiments 1 and 2 
replicate perfectly. Naturally, this leaves open the possibility that the outcome sensitivity and 
dynamic variance of reasonableness is exacerbated by the hindsight bias in the many situations 
where probabilities are unknown or hard to quantify. However, it demonstrates that the outcome-
sensitivity and dynamic variance of reasonableness does not constitutively depend on perceived 
probability. The folk concept seems to be directly sensitive to outcomes. 
 
Over the last two decades, considerable effort has been devoted to a better understanding of what 
the legal concept of reasonableness does and should mean, and how potential pitfalls in the 
application of the reasonable person standard can be avoided. Perhaps the subjective/objective and 
the normative/descriptive debates have received the most attention, and they are, without a doubt, 
of great practical importance. The potential outcome-sensitivity of reasonableness ascriptions, by 
contrast, has received next to no attention, and there is no literature on the dynamic sensitivity of 
reasonableness at all. This constitutes a serious shortcoming because there is no legal case invoking 
the reasonable person standard where these two features do not matter. It is thus hard to overstate 
the practical importance of the present findings and more research – both theoretical and empirical 
– is required to explore how conceptual alignment can be achieved so as to prevent further legal 
injustice due to the law’s misunderstanding of the folk concept of reasonableness.  
                                                        
30 It does not matter whether the effect of hindsight on perceived probability is viewed as a bias or as a rational 
heuristic (as discussed in Section 4.4). The point here is simply that the effect of outcome on reasonableness is, at 
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